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COAST BANK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. W. J. MIN-
DERHOUT et at, Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] Mortgages-Equitable Mortgages-Agreement to Give :Mort-
,age.-Every express executory agreement in writing whereby 
the contracting party sufBciently indicates an intention to 
make some particular property, real or personal, or fund, there-
in described or identified, a security for a debt or other obli-
gation ereates an equitable lien on the property so indicated, 
which is enforceable against the property in the hands not 
only of the original contractor, but also of his purcllaSertl 
or encumbrancers with notice. . 
[2] I4.-Equitable Mortgages-Agreement to Give Mortgage.-An 
agreement that particular property is security for a debt gives 
rise to an equitable mortgage even though it does not consti· 
tute a legal mortgage; specific mention of a security interest is 
unnecessary if it otherwise nppears thnt the purties intended to 
ereate such an interest. 
[8] Id.-Equitable Mortgages-Agreement to Give Mortgage.-In 
an action to foreclose an equitable mortgage on certain real 
property, where plaintiff pleaded and defendants admitted by' 
demurring and failing to answer that plainti1i and the debtors 
intended to create a security interest in the property by the 
agreement signed by the parties, such pleaded meaning was 
supported by provisions of the agreement restricting the rights 
of the debtors in dealing with their property for plainti1f's 
benefit, describing itself as ''For use with a Property Improve-
[1] See Oal.Jur.24, Mortgages and Trust Deeds, 1 12; Am.Jur .. 
Mortgages (1st ed § 14). 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Mortgages, § 13; [4] Covenants, 
115. 
) 
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ment Loan," specifically setting forth the property it coverea, 
ana authorizing plnintiff to record it. 
[4] Oovenants-ltestrictions-Restraints on Alienation.-Al-
though a written instrument creating an equitable mortgage on 
certain real property and providing that the debtors would not 
transfer the property without the creditor's consent contained 
a restraint on alienation, such provision did not make the in-
strument invalid in an action by the creditor against trans-
ferees of the property, not to enforce the promise not to 
transfer the property, but only to foreclose the creditor's 
security interest therein. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Luis Obispo County. Ray B. Lyon, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to foreclose an equitable mortgage on certain real 
property allegedly created by an instrument embodying 
plaintiff's security interest in such property. Judgment de-
creeing foreclosure and ordering sale of the property 
affirmed. 
F. W. Audrain and Abraham Resisa for Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Baker, Farnham & Began and William D. Began for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
Morrison, Foerster, Holloway, Clinton & Clark, Russell E. 
Teasdale and Robert D. Raven as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment fore-
closing an equitable mortgage on certain real property in San 
Luis Obispo County. The trial court overruled defendants' 
general demurrer and upon defendants' failure to answer the 
complaint decreed foreclosure and ordered a sale of the prop-
erty. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 585, subd. 4.) 
From January 18 to November 12, 1957, plaintiff bankl 
made several loans to Burton and Donald Enright, who exe-
cuted a promissory note for the full amount of the indebted-
[4] See Oal.Jur.2d, Covenants, Conditions, ana Restrictions, § 79 
et seq. j Am.Jur., Perpetuitie~ and Restraints on Alienation (1st ed 
§ 66 et seq). 
IPonnerl)' kDOWD as Ba.nk of BelmOlit Shore. 
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ness. In a separate instrument dated January 18, 1957,2 the 
Enrights agreed that they would not transfer or encumber 
without plaintiff's consent certain real property owned by 
them until all of their indebtedness was paid. If the Enrights 
defaulted, plaintiff could declare all remaining indebtedness 
due forthwith. Plaintiff immediately recorded the instrument 
as authorized therein. In November 1958, while part of the 
indebtedness was still unpaid, the Enrights conveyed the 
property to defendants without plaintiff's knowledge or con-
sent. Defendants concede that they had not only constructive 
but actual knowledge of the terms of the agreement. Plaintiff 
apparently elected to accelerate the due date, but was unable 
to collect the unpaid balance. It then brought this action to 
foreclose the equitable mortgage that it clailns the instrument 
created. 
[1] "[EJvery express executory agreement in writing, 
whereby the contracting party sufficiently indicates an inten-
2" AGR.ElWENT NOT To ENCUMBER OR TRANSFEB PROPERTY 
" (For use with Property Improvement Loan) 
"In consideration of any loan or advance made by Bank of Belmont 
Shore (hereinafter referred to as 'Bank ') to the undersigned, either 
jointly or severally, the undersigned (he]'einafter referred to 8S 'Bor-
rower' whether one or more), jointly and severally promise and agree 
that until all such loans and advances and all other indebtedness or 
liabilities to the Bank shall have been paid in full, or until 21 years 
following the death of the last survivor of the undersigned, whichever 
shall :first occur, they will pay all taxes, assessments and charges of 
every kind, imposed or levied, or which may be imposed or levied upon 
the hereinafter described real property prior to the time when any .of 
such taxes, assessments or charges shall become delinquent and will not, 
without the consent in writing of Bank, first had and obtained, create or 
permit any lien or other encumbrances (other than those presently exist· 
ing and/or securing the payment of loans and advances made to them by 
Bank) to exist on said real property, and will not transfer, sell, hypoth-
ecate, assign, or in any manner whatever dispose of said real property, 
or any interest therein or any portion thereof, which real property is 
situated in 8a" Lvii Ow.po County, California. ••• [Description 
omitted.) 
"It is furthel' agreed and understood that if default be made in the 
performance of any of the terms hereof, or of any Instrument executed 
by Borrower in connection herewith, or. in the payment of any indehted-
ness or liabilities now or hereafter' owing to Bank, Bank may, at its 
election, in addition to all other remedies and rights which it may have 
by law, declare the entire remaining unpaid principal and interest of 
any obligations or indebtedness then remaining unpaid to the Bank due 
and payable forthwith. 
"It is further agreed and understood that Bank may, in its discre· 
tion, and is hereby authorized. by Borrower, to cause this instrument to 
be recorded at such time and in lueb places as Bank may, in its 
discretion eleet. J J 
.) 
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tion to make some particular property, real or personal, or 
fund, therein described or identified, a security for a debt or 
other obligation . • . creates an equitable lien upon the prop-
erty 80 indicated, which is enforceable against the property 
in the hands not only of the original contractor, but of his 
•.. purchasers or encumbrancers with notice." (4 Pomeroy, 
Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed. Symons) § 1235.) Thus, a 
promise to give a mortgage or a trust deed on particular 
property as security for a debt win be specifically enforced 
by granting an equitable mortgage. (McColgan v.' Bank 01 
California Assn., 208 Cal. 329, 336-337 [281 P. 381, 65 A.L.R. 
1075]; Daggett v. Rankin, 31 Cal. 321,327.) [2] An 
agreement that particular property is security for a debt also 
gives rise to an equitable mortgage even though it does not 
constitute a legal mortgage. (Higgins v. Manson, 126 Cal. 
467, 470 [58 P. 907, 77 Am. St. Rep. 192] ; Dingley v. Bank 
of Ventura, 57 Cal. 467,472; Racouillat v. Sansevain, 32 Cal. 
376,388-389.) If a mortgage or trust deed is defectively exe-
cuted, for example, an equitable mortgage will be recognized. 
(Burns v. Peters, 5 Ca1.2d 619, 625 [55 P.2d 1182]; Title Ins. 
4f Trust Co. v. California Development Co., 171 Cal. 173,201-
202 [152 P. 5421; Earle v. Sunnyside Land Co., 150 Cal. 214, 
227-228 [88 P. 920]; Peers v. McLaughlin, 88 Cal. 294, 297-
298 [26 P. 119, 22 Am. St. Rep. 306] ; Remington v. Higgins, 
54 Cal. 620, 623.624; see Love v. Sierra Nev. Lake W Gter tt 
Mining Co., 32 Cal. 639, 652 [91 Am. Dec. 602].) Specific 
mention of a security interest is unnecessary if it otherwise 
appears that the parties intended to create such an interest. 
(McColgan v. Bank of California ASBn., supra, 208 Cal. 329, 
338; Earle v. Sunnyside LGnd Co., supra, 150 Cal. 214, 228; 
Higgins v. Manson, supra, 126 Cal. 467, 469.) 
[3] Defendants contend that the instrument did not cre-
ate an equitable mortgage because it does not show on its face 
that the parties intended to make the property security for 
the indebtedness. They suggest that the parties intended to 
protect the lender in another manner than by giving it a 
security interest in the property and point out that the par-
ties must have been familiar with the usual methods of creat-
ing a legal.mortgage or trust deed on real property. In their 
view, plaintiff simply extended unsecured credit to the En. 
rights as property owners while retaining the power to with-
draw the credit by accelerating the due date of the indebted-
ness if the Enrights breached their agreement not to convey 
or encumber the property. They invoke cases from other juris-
,. I 
) 
) 
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dictions holding that comparable' instruments do not create 
security interests. (B. Kll.ppenheimer cf Co. v. Mornin, 78 
F.2d 261, 263-264; Fisher v. Safe Harbor Bealty Co. (Del.) 
150 A.2d 617, 620; Western States Fin. Co; v. Buff, 108 Ore. 
442, 449-454 [215 P. SOl, 216 P. 1020] ; Knott 'V. Shepherds-
toionManufacfuring Co., 30 W.Va. '790, 796 [5 S.E. 266] ; 
see also Osborne, Mortgages, § 44.) 
In the present case, however, plaintiff pleaded and defend-
ants admitted by demurring and failing to answer that the 
parties intended to create a security interest in the property. 
Accordingly, the' question presented is not what meaning ap- il' pears from the face of tIle inh~rumh ent alone, but. whether the '.' 
pleaded meaning is one to w lC the instrument 18 reasonably 
susceptible. (Richards v. Farmers' cf Merchants' Bank, 7 
Cal.App. 387,395 [94 P. 393] ; see 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, 
pp. 1231-] 232.) It is essentially the question that would be 
presented had defendants denied that the parties intended to 
create a security interl.'st and plaintiff had offered extrinsic 
evidence to prove that they did. Such evidence would be ad-
missible to interpret the instrument, but not to give it a 
meaning to which it is not reasonably susceptible. (Imbo.ch 
v. Schultz, 58 Ca1.2d 858, 860-861 [27 Cal.Rptr. 160, 377 P.2d 
272J; see Rest. Contracts, § 235{d) ; Code Civ. Proc., § 1860; 
Beid 'V. Overland Machined Prods., 55 Ca1.2d 203, 210 [10 
Cal.Rptr. 819, 359 P.2d 251J ; Beneficial Fire d'; Cas. 1m. Co. 
'V. Kurt Hitke d'; Co., 46 Ca1.2d 517, 524-525 [297 P.2d 428] ; 
Barham 'V. Barham, 33 Cal.2d 416, 422-423 [202 P.2d 289] ; 
BaZfour v. Fresno Canal cf Irr. Co., 109 Cal. 221, 225-226 (41 
P.876].) . 
The instrument restricts the rights of the Enrights in deal-
ing with their property for plaintiff's benefit; it describes 
itself as "For use with Property Improvement Loan," it 
specifically sets forth the property it covers, and it authorizes 
plaintiff to record it. These provisions afford some indication 
that the parties intended to create a security interest and are 
clearly sufficient to support the pleaded meaning. 
[4] Defendants contend that even if the instrument 
created an eg.uitable mortgage, it cannot be given effect be-
cause it contains an invalid restraint on alienation. The pro-
vision that the Enrights would not transfer the property 
without plaintiff's consent is ~ restraint on alienation. (Fritz 
v. Gt.'lbert, 8 Cal.2d 68, 71 [63 P.2d 291]; Prey 'V. Stamey, 
110 Cal. 423,426 [42 P. 908J; Murray v. Green, 64 Cal. 363, 
. 367 [28 P. 118].) A restraint created by contract is governed 
,. 
) 
" 
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by the rules that govern a restraint in a conveyance (Prey v. 
Stanley, supra, 110 Cal. 423,427), and it has frequently been 
stated that any restraint on alienation is invalid. (Los 
Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 682 [186 P. 596, 9 
A.L.R. 115]; Bonnell v. McLaughlin, 173 Cal. 213, 216 [159 
P. 590]; Murray v. Green, supra, 64 Cal. 363, 368; Title 
Guar. ~ Trust 00. v. Garrott, 42 Cal.App. 152, 158 [183 P. 
470].) 
The view that the common-law rule against restraints on 
alienationS prohibits all such restraints has been forcefully 
criticized on the ground that it loses sight of the purposes of 
the rule and needlessly invalidates reasonable restraints de-
signed to protect justifiable interests of the parties. (See 
Sweet, Restraints on Alienation, 33 L.Q.Rev. 236, 246-253; 
Manning, The Development of Restra.ints on Alienation Since 
Gray, 48 Harv.L.Rev. 373, 398-400, 406; Northwest Real 
Estate 00. v. Serio, 156 Md. 229, 236 [144 A. 245] (Cbief 
Judge Bond dissenting) ; cr. Simes & Smith, Future Interests 
(2d ed.) §§ 1115, 1168; Bernhar,d, The Minority Doctrine 
Ooncerning Direct Restraints on Alienation, 57 Mich.L.Rev. 
1173, 1177.) 
The protection of several such interests has been recog-
nized as justifying reasonable restraints on alienation. 
Spendthrift trusts are permitted because of the settlor '8 in-
terest in protecting potentially improvident beneficiaries. 
(Civ. Code, §§ 859, 867; Seymour v. McAvoy, 121 Cal. 438, 
442-443 [53 P. 946, 41 L.R.A. 544].) A lease for a term of 
years can be made terminable upon alienation because of the 
lessor's interest in the personal character of the lessee. (See 
People v. Klopstock, 24 Cal.2d 897, 901 [151 P.2d 641]; 
Chapman v. Great Western Gypsum Co., 216 Cal. 420, 426-
427 [14 P.2d 758, 85 A.L.R. 917] ; Murray v. Green, supra, 64 
Cal. 363, 367; see RE'st., Property, § 410.) A life estate can be 
made terminable upon alienation because of the interest of 
the remainderman in the life tenant's character. (See Hall v. 
Brittain, 171 Cal. 424, 425 [153 P. 906]; Rest., Property, . 
§ 409.) A corporation can restrict the transfer of its shares 
because of the interest of shareholders in the persons with 
whom they are in business. (See Corp. Code, § 501, subd. 
(g); Vann~cci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 143-145 [17 P.2d 
706] ; Tu-Vu Drive-In Oorp. v. Ashkins, ante, p. 283 [38 Cal. 
i 
'The rule is partially eodified in Civil Code sectioD 711, whieh pro-
Yides: "Conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the inter-
.. ueated, an .,old. ' , 
J 
) 
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Rptr. 348,391 P.2d 828].) A restraint on alienation in an 
executory land contract has been upheld because of the 'Ven-
dor's interest in the upkeep of the property and in the char-
acter and integrity of the purchaser. (Slomanv. Cutler, 258 
Mich. 872, 876 [242 N.W. 735]; flee Goddard, Non-Assign-
ment Provisions inLand Contracts, 81 Mich.L.Rev. 1; In f'e 
Congested Dists. Board (1919) 1 Irish R. 146, 150; ct. Rest., 
Property, § 416.) In the present case it was not unreasonable 
for plaintiff to condition its continued extension of credit to 
the Enrights on their retaining their interest in the property 
that stood as security for the debt. AccordinglYt plaintiff 
validly provided that it might accelerate the due date if the 
Enrights encumbered or transferred the property. 
Whether the promise not to transfer or encumber the prop-
erty would be directly enforcible by injunction, specific per-
formance or an action for damages is another question. It is 
open to doubt whether such a promise would be a reasonable 
restraint when, as in this case, plaintiff had the additional 
protection of a security interest and the right to declare the 
entire debt due in the event of default. It is unneceSsary, 
however, to decide this question now. Plaintiff is seeking not 
to enforce the Enrights' promise not to transfer the property 
but only to foreclose its security interest. The creation of 
that interest was a separate lawful object of the a,gl'-eement. 
(Civ. Code,§ 1599; Bonnell v. McLaughlin, supra, 178 Cal. 
213, 216; Murray v. Green, supra, 64 Cal. 363, 369.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobri-
ner J., and Peek, J., concurred. 
, 
